Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly
Volume 47
Number 1 Fall 2019

Article 8

Fall 2019

Corporate Constituents: Corporations Have More Influence on the
Federal Government than Real People Under Current U.S.
Campaign Finance Regulations
Colin Schoell

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Colin Schoell, Corporate Constituents: Corporations Have More Influence on the Federal Government than
Real People Under Current U.S. Campaign Finance Regulations, 47 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 165 (2019).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol47/iss1/8

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly by an authorized editor of UC Hastings
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.

(DO NOT DELETE)

10/7/2019 11:44 AM

Corporate Constituents:
Corporations Have More Influence on the
Federal Government than Real People Under
Current U.S. Campaign Finance Regulations
by COLIN SCHOELL*

Introduction
In the 2016 United States presidential election, just 55.7% of votingage citizens in the United States went to the polls and cast ballots.1 This
percentage ranks 26th among developed countries, behind countries such as
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Estonia.2 One of the main reasons that
Americans do not vote is because they feel the system is corrupt, and their
voices do not have an impact.3 This feeling that the system is corrupt likely
stems from the massive amount of outside money spent every two years on
campaigns, especially by super political actions committees (“PACs”) that
are often funded by corporations.4 This feeling that the political system is
corrupt led to President Donald Trump’s wildly popular promise to “Drain
the Swamp.”5 However, not only has he failed to fulfill that promise, but he

* J.D. Candidate 2020, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.S.
Environmental Studies, University of California, Santa Barbara, 2017.
1. Drew Desilver, U.S. Trails Most Developed Countries In Voter Turnout, Pew Research
Center (May 21, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/05/21/u-s-voter-turnout-trailsmost-developed-countries/.
2. Id.
3. Asma Khalid, Don Gonyea & Leila Fadel, On The Sidelines of Democracy: Exploring
Why So Many Americans Don’t Vote, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Sept. 10, 2018, 5:07 AM), https://www.
npr.org/2018/09/10/645223716/on-the-sidelines-of-democracy-exploring-why-so-many-american
s-dont-vote.
4. Outside Spending, OPEN SECRETS https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending
/index.php?type=Y&filter=S (last visited Sept. 13, 2019).
5. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Oct. 18, 2016, 8:33 AM), https://twitter.
com/realdonaldtrump/status/788402585816276992.
[165]
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has exacerbated the problem in the eyes of many. For that reason, campaign
finance reform has become increasingly popular among Americans –
Democratic leaders, including the Speaker of the House of Represenatives,
Nancy Pelosi, have taken initiative by means of legislative vote in the House
of Representatives, towards reducing the influence of political money.7
This Note will analyze the changes in campaign finance regulations,
the reasons for those changes, and potential future changes in campaign
finance regulation. Part I of this Note will review the history of campaign
financing in the United States, from the earliest federal elections up to the
most recent. There have been several major shifts in how campaigns are
financed over the course of the United States’s 242-year history, evolving
as the country grew from an estimated 2.5 million residents to nearly 330
million today.8 Part I will accomplish this review by examining three major
pieces of congressional legislation that precipitated major shifts in
campaign finance regulation: the Tillman Act of 1907, the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971 (“FECA”), and the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 2002 (“BCRA”).
Part II will examine the four main United States Supreme Court cases
that interpreted FECA and BCRA, and that currently govern federal
campaign spending. These cases are Buckley v. Valeo, McConnell v. Federal
Election Commission, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, and
McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission.99 These cases show a trend
toward deregulation of campaign financing, and have created a system with
essentially no limits on the amount of money a person or corporation may
spend to influence political candidates.
Part III will examine the current state of federal campaign financing,
including the impact that the large amount of money needed for a
congressional campaign has on Congress’ effectiveness, and public
perception of political corruption. These effects and perceptions will be
compared to the rationales set forth by the Justices of the United States
Supreme Court in the four main opinions on campaign finance, to determine
whether those arguments still hold true or have been subverted by the current

6. Helaine Olen, Trump Didn’t Drain the Swamp. Supporters are Starting to Notice., WASH.
POST (Sept. 11, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2018/09/11/trum
p-didnt-drain-the-swamp-supporters-are-starting-to-notice/.
7. Peter Overby, Democrats Say Their First Bill Will Focus On Strengthening Democracy
at Home, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 12, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/11/12/6656358
32/democrats-say-their-first-bill-will-focus-on-strengthening-democracy-at-home.
8. Derick Moore, Fun Facts: From Counties Named Liberty to $368.6M Worth of Fireworks
Sold, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU (July 2, 2019), https://www.census.gov/library/stories/
2019/07/july-fourth-celebrating-243-years-of-independence.html.
9. Buckley, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); McConnell, 540 U.S. 93 (2003); Citizens United, 558 U.S.
310 (2010); McCutcheon, 572 U.S. 185 (2014).
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system of campaign finance. I find that while the arguments, taken
individually, make sense or could work in a perfect world, the combination
of these opinions, as applied in the real world, has created a system rife with
corruption or the appearance of corruption that Congress tried to prevent by
regulating campaign financing. This corruption is protected by the Supreme
Court decisions under the guise of protecting freedom of speech under the
First Amendment. This Note will also analyze the fundraising strategies
used in recent elections because, while campaign finance laws apply to all
candidates equally, the two major American political parties have utilized
different strategies in order to raise the highest amount of money without
losing voter support.
Finally, Part IV will argue for several ways in which meaningful
campaign finance reform could be accomplished to reduce voter
disillusionment, and the appearance of corruption through campaign
donations. These potential options include: a new Supreme Court ruling, the
passage of legislation by Congress, or finally, a new constitutional
amendment. This section will provide examples and analyze the benefits
and consequences of each option, along with the likelihood that each option
will occur.

I. History of U.S. Campaign Financing Legislation
Just as he was a Founding Father of the United States, President George
Washington was the “father of campaign finance reform.”10 After losing his
first election to the Virginia House of Burgesses in 1755, Washington threw
a lavish feast to persuade the electorate to vote for him.11 This prompted the
first campaign finance law in one of the colonies of the future United States
of America, which prohibited candidates from giving away “money, meat,
drink, entertainment or provision or . . . any present, gift, reward or
entertainment etc. in order to be elected.”12 The first law passed by Congress
that addressed this issue was the Naval Appropriations Bill of 1867, which
prohibited soliciting naval yard workers for money.13 The second law that
addressed the issue was the Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act in 1883,
which prohibited government officials from soliciting civil service workers

10. Jim Toedtman, Campaign Cash Degrades Discussion of Issues, AMERICAN ASS’N OF
RETIRED PERSONS (Apr. 10, 2012), https://www.aarp.org/politics-society/government-elections/
info-04-2012/campaign-cash-key-issues.html.
11. Jaime Fuller, From George Washington to Shaun McCutcheon: A Brief-ish History of
Campaign Finance Reform., WASHI. POST (Apr. 3, 2014, 9:15 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/04/03/a-history-of-campaign-finance-reform-from-george-washington
-to-shaun-mccutcheon/.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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for contributions in exchange for retaining their positions. These simplistic
restrictions were just the beginning of attempts to limit the amount of money
used in an effort to swing an election in favor of a specific candidate.

A. The Tillman Act of 1907 and the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947
During his campaign for the 1904 United States presidential election,
Theodore Roosevelt accepted more than $2 million from the corporations of
wealthy capitalists, which helped him win the presidency by a large margin.15
President Roosevelt then called on Congress to enact “vigorous measures to
eradicate” perceived political corruption created by political contributions
from corporations.16 Congress listened to Roosevelt and passed the Tillman
Act of 1907, which prohibited corporations from making monetary
donations to national political campaigns.17 In 1943, Congress passed the
Smith-Connelly Act and extended this prohibition on campaign donations to
labor unions, which had begun using their dues for political donations.18
While these laws prohibited corporations and labor unions from
donating directly to political campaigns, they could still make their own
expenditures in support of or in opposition to any candidate through
“PACs”.19 Congress closed this loophole by passing the Taft-Hartley Act of
1947, and prohibited corporations and labor unions from making
independent expenditures in all federal political campaigns.20 The labor
unions instead used the first PAC, the Congress of Industrial Organizations
(“CIO”), as a workaround.21 This was a legitimate legal strategy because the
CIO, rather than the unions, donated or made expenditures to federal
political campaigns.22
These laws were not very effective, however, because Congress failed
to implement an effective method of enforcement. The first federal
campaign financial disclosure laws were passed in 1910 in the House of
Representatives, and in 1911 in the Senate, three and four years after the

14. Fuller, supra note 11.
15. Sidney Milkis, Theodore Roosevelt: Campaigns and Elections, UVA MILLER CENTER
OF PUB.AFFAIRS, https://millercenter.org/president/roosevelt/campaigns-and-elections (last visited
July 23, 2019).
16. Fuller, supra note 11.
17. Tillman Act, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864 (1907).
18. Fuller, supra note 11.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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passage of the Tillman Act, respectively. Candidates easily evaded these
laws however, as there was no penalty for a candidate who claimed to have
no knowledge of spending on his behalf.24 The sheer amount of campaign
donations and expenditures that went unreported is demonstrated by the fact
that political candidates in the 1968 congressional campaigns reported $8.5
million in campaign contributions, while candidates in the 1972
congressional campaigns, following the passage of FECA, reported $88.9
million in campaign contributions.25 Prior to 1972, candidates simply would
not report any contributions that exceeded the limits that were in place, and,
if caught, claimed to have no knowledge of the excess spending.26

B. Federal Election Campaign Act and the Federal Election
Commission
In an effort to more effectively regulate the amount of money donated
and spent on federal political campaigns, Congress enacted FECA in 1971.27
This legislation required full reporting of all campaign contributions and
expenditures.28 Additionally, the law laid the groundwork for the first
official labor union PACs and corporate PACs, even though the CIO had
been around for several decades at this point.29 Along with FECA, Congress
passed the United States Revenue Act of 1971 (“Revenue Act”), which
allowed citizens to check a box on their tax form to give one of their tax
dollars to finance United States presidential campaigns during the general
election.30 As a condition for the public financing, once a presidential
candidate accepted public campaign donations, they could no longer accept
private contributions.31
Under the Revenue Act, the Clerk of the United States House of
Representatives (“Clerk”), the Secretary of the Senate (“Secretary”), and the
Comptroller General of the United States General Accounting Officer
(“Comptroller General”) were responsible for monitoring compliance with
disclosure requirements, and for reporting violations to the United States

23. The Federal Election Campaign Laws: A Short History, FEDERAL ELECTION
COMMISSION, https://transition.fec.gov/info/appfour.htm (last visited July 23, 2019) [hereinafter
FEC History].
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972).
28. FEC History, supra note 23.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Public Funding of Presidential Campaigns Brochure, FED. ELEC. COMM’N, https://
transition.fec.gov/pages/brochures/pubfund.shtml#anchor688095 (last visited July 23, 2019).
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Department of Justice (“Justice Department”) for prosecution. This system
of oversight was extremely ineffective, and although the Clerk, Secretary,
and Comptroller General reported approximately 7,100 violations to the
Justice Department, very few violations were actually prosecuted.33 These
continued violations of campaign finance regulations led Congress to amend
FECA in 1974.34
Congress passed comprehensive amendments to FECA in 1974
hoping to limit the amount of money spent on elections, and to eliminate
violations by establishing an independent regulation agency, the Federal
Election Commission (“FEC”).35 The FEC took over campaign finance
oversight from the Clerk, Secretary, and Comptroller General.36 Under
these amendments, the President, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and the president pro tempore of the Senate each appoint
two commissioners to comprise the six voting members of the FEC.37 The
final two members of the eight–member commission are appointed by the
Secretary and the Clerk as ex officio (nonvoting) members.38 Congress
gave the FEC recordkeeping, disclosure, and investigatory functions, as
well as extensive rulemaking, adjudicatory, and enforcement powers over
federal campaign financing regulations.39
In order to regulate the amount of money spent on federal political
campaigns, Congress used these amendments to establish limits on the
contributions and expenditures a person or group could make to one
candidate, and in the aggregate.40 FECA limited individual contributions to
$1,000 for any single candidate per election, and $25,000 overall per
election.41
Additionally, FECA limited campaign expenditures by
individuals and groups “relative to a clearly identified candidate” to $1,000
per year, and limited campaign spending per candidate using prescribed
limits.42 Just two years after Congress enacted these limits, however, they
were challenged in Buckley v. Valeo, which is discussed below.43

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

FEC History, supra note 23.
Id.
Fed. Elec. Campaign Act Amends. of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974).
FEC History, supra note 23.
Id.
Id.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 113.
Id. at 110.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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C. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”)
All of the legislation leading up to and including FECA focused on the
regulation of “hard money,” which is donated directly to a political campaign
or spent advocating for a specific candidate’s election or defeat.44 This
legislation did nothing to regulate the amount of “soft money,” which is
donated to political parties, or “party-building” activities, such as “get-outthe-vote” drives, voter registration efforts, and generic political party
advertisements.45 An unlimited amount of soft money could be donated to
candidates, and the amount of soft money raised by both parties skyrocketed
from $105.1 million in 1993-1994 to $487.4 million in 1999-2000.46
In response to this influx of unregulated money into political parties,
Congress passed the BCRA, also known as the McCain-Feingold Act.47 This
legislation sought to address “the increased importance of ‘soft money’,
[and] the proliferation of ‘issue ads,’” which focus on a policy issue, rather
than on electing or defeating a candidate.48 To address these issues,
Congress regulated the use of soft money by political parties and candidates,
and prohibited corporations and unions from using general treasury funds to
influence federal election outcomes.49 These regulations were challenged
the very next year in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, which is
discussed below.50

II. United States Supreme Court Decisions on
Constitutionality of Campaign Financing
The United States Supreme Court did not enter the arena of campaign
finance regulation until 1976, choosing to defer to Congress’ knowledge and
understanding of the corrupting power of money in politics. However, the
passage of FECA led to constitutional challenges that eventually reached the
Supreme Court.51 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Colombia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals “) viewed FECA as “by
far the most comprehensive reform legislation (ever) passed by Congress”
concerning federal elections, and upheld all but one provision, which they

44. Bill Mears, Where the Money Is: A Campaign Spending Primer, CNN (Jan. 23, 2012,
7:19 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2012/01/23/politics/campaign-spending-primer/index.html.
45. Id.
46. STEFFEN SCHMIDT, MACK SHELLEY & BARBARA BARDES, AM. GOV’T AND POLITICS
TODAY 360 (Carolyn Merrill et al. eds., 14th ed. 2008).
47. Fuller, supra note 11.
48. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 93.
49. Id. at 94.
50. Id.
51. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7.
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considered to be too vague or overbroad. Since then, several subsequent
Supreme Court decisions have chipped away at campaign finance on
constitutional grounds.

A. Buckley v. Valeo (1978)
In order to challenge the contribution and expenditure limits established
by FECA, a group of plaintiffs, including a presidential candidate, a senator
seeking reelection, and a potential contributor, filed suit claiming that the
limits unconstitutionally interfered with their freedoms of speech and
association, which are protected by the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution.53 The Court found some merit in their arguments, specifically
the idea that political expenditures qualified as speech, rather than conduct,
and therefore limiting political expenditures infringed on the First
Amendment’s protection of freedom of speech.54 The Court upheld FECA’s
individual contribution limits, the establishment of the FEC, disclosure and
reporting requirements, and public financing scheme for presidential
elections as constitutional under the First Amendment.55 However, the Court
struck down limits on campaign expenditures, both per candidate limits and
aggregate limits on independent expenditures by individuals and groups, and
limits on personal expenditures by candidates because they violated the
freedom of speech and freedom of association.56
While the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals found the restrictions of
monetary expenditures to be symbolic conduct that could be regulated as
such, the Supreme Court determined that some communications made by
spending money “involve speech alone, some involve conduct primarily, and
some involve a combination of the two.”57 The Court found that, even if the
expenditure of money is considered to be conduct, the limits would still be
unconstitutional under the First Amendment because the government’s
interest in “equalizing the relative ability of all voters to affect electoral
outcomes”
through
individual
expenditure
limits
suppresses
communication.58 Although the regulation of independent political
expenditures was not content based, the Court found that the government
does have an interest in regulating the conduct of spending because the
communication integral to the conduct was harmful.59
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 831 (1975)).
Id. at 14.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 143.
Id.
Id. at 16.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 17.
U.S. v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968).
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In its analysis, the Court differentiated between the limits on individual
expenditures and the limits on contributions by the severity of each limit’s
restriction on First Amendment rights of those spending the money.60 While
limits on expenditures explicitly capped the amount of political speech a
person could disseminate using their money, a limit on donating to a
candidate “entails only a marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability
to engage in free communication.”61 This is because donating money to a
candidate communicates personal support for that candidate, but the quantity
of communication of that support “does not increase perceptibly with the
size of his contribution.”62 The communication rests solely on the “symbolic
act of contributing.”63
This distinction between contributions and expenditures seems rather
arbitrary, as independently spending money in support of a candidate could
be viewed as a similarly symbolic act to contributing money to that
candidate. The same could be said of the reverse of the Court’s reasoning:
limiting the amount of money an individual may contribute to a candidate
effectively limits the amount of speech in support of that candidate their
money can be used for. The Court explains this discrepancy by emphasizing
that, for a contribution to become political expression, it must involve
someone other than the contributor.64 Additionally, the Court describes the
contribution limit as a restriction on “one aspect of the contributor’s freedom
of political association,” while individual expenditure limits are regulations
that primarily and substantially infringe on the freedom of speech.65
In addition to the difference in which First Amendment protection is
infringed upon by the limits on individual expenditures or contributions, the
government interest in regulating the amount of money an individual may
contribute to a candidate is much stronger. The main argument, which the
Court finds “unnecessary to look beyond” to find a constitutionally sufficient
justification for the contribution limit, is the “prevention of corruption and
the appearance of corruption spawned by the real or imagined coercive
influence of large financial contributions on candidates’ positions.”66 This
government interest is not present in the regulation of individual

60. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 21.
63. Id. (By contributing to a candidate, a person associates themselves with that candidate
but cannot become more associated with the candidate by contributing more. In contrast, a person
can always produce more speech for a candidate by making more independent expenditures for that
candidate.).
64. Id. at 21.
65. Id. at 24-25.
66. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25.
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expenditures, because contributions lend themselves much more readily
to a political quid pro quo with current or future office holders.67 The
Court emphasizes the importance of eliminating actual quid pro quo
arrangements or even the appearance of corruption in the political system,
because otherwise “the integrity of our system of representative
democracy is undermined.”68
Because the government’s interest in preventing corruption or the
appearance of corruption in politics was sufficient to sustain the individual
contribution limits, the Court did not analyze the two secondary
governmental interests at play.69 However, those interests are worth
mentioning here. First, the limits serve to quiet the voices of the wealthy,
and hence, to equalize the relative ability of all citizens to affect electoral
outcomes.70 Second, the contribution limits serve as a deterrent on the
skyrocketing cost of political campaigns, and gives candidates without
access to large sums of money the ability to run for office on a level playing
field. These interests are quite compelling, as the Court recognizes the
“electorate’s increasing dependence on . . . mass media for news and
information,” as well as the effectiveness of those mediums.71
Unfortunately, the Court failed to recognize the distorting effect that the
wealthy who flood those mediums with their message, and effectively shut
out all other messages. The government has a compelling interest in
preventing this distortion, because it silences the messages of the less
wealthy, counteracting the reasons for upholding individual campaign
expenditure limits.
Justice White dissented in part from the Opinion of the Court, arguing
that individual expenditure limits violate the First Amendment.72 He
emphasized the fact that “Congress has the power under the Constitution
to regulate the election of federal officers,” and to protect the election from
corruption.73 Because this power is clear under the Constitution, “the
choice of means to that end presents a question primarily addressed to the
judgment of Congress.”74 Congress concluded that limits on both
contributions and expenditures were “essential if the aims of the act were
to be achieved fully.”75
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26.
Id. at 26-27.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 25-26.
Id. at 19.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 259 (White, J., dissenting in part).
Id. at 257-58.
Burroughs v. U.S., 290 U.S. 534, 547 (1934).
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 258 (White, J., dissenting in part).
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Justice White accurately identifies that because both limits are content
neutral, the case depends on “whether the nonspeech interests of the Federal
Government in regulating the use of money in political campaigns are
sufficiently urgent to justify the incidental effects that the limitations” have
on First Amendment rights.76 He also correctly points to the glaring
inconsistency in the Court’s decision to uphold the limits on individual
contributions while striking down the limits on individual expenditures,
because “Congress was plainly of the view that these expenditures also have
corruptive potential.”77
Finally, “the argument that money is speech and that limiting the flow
of money to the speaker violates the First Amendment proves entirely too
much.”78 Federal and state taxes take money out of citizens’ pockets and
company treasuries, but are not unconstitutional for siphoning away “large
sums that would otherwise be available for communicative activities.”79
And under the Court’s decision here, if two people purchased $1 million in
television advertisements in support of a candidate, but one first acquired the
approval of the candidate, only that person would be in violation of the law.80
These inconsistencies show the illogical nature of the Court’s decision to
uphold individual contribution limits while striking down individual
expenditure limits.
Buckley v. Valeo dealt solely with “hard money” contributions,
expenditures, and disclosure requirements, and following the decision, both
political parties began looking for ways to work around the upheld
contribution limits. This work around was found in the use of “soft money,”
as discussed earlier.81 The passage of BCRA led to the second major United
States Supreme Court case regarding campaign finance reform laws.

B. McConnell v. Federal Election Commission (2003)
BCRA sought to limit “soft money” contributions as well as financing
from labor union and corporation general funds, but the constitutionality of
those regulations was promptly challenged and decided by the Supreme
Court in 2003.82 Following reasoning similar to Buckley, the Court upheld
the restrictions on soft money contributions to political parties due to the
government’s interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 260.
Id. at 261.
Id. at 262.
Id. at 263.
Id. at 261.
Mears, supra note 44.
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 93.
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corruption.
The restrictions imposed only a “marginal impact” on the
ability to engage in political speech, and that impact was outweighed by the
government’s interest in those restrictions.84
The restriction on the expenditure of soft money by candidates on
advertising, which explicitly advocated for the election or defeat of a
political candidate, was similarly upheld.85 The Court found that the
restriction was narrowly tailored to accomplish the goal of limiting
corruption or the appearance of corruption in the political system because
those donations have “the greatest potential to corrupt or give rise to the
appearance of corruption of federal candidates.”86 General issue
advertisements and advertisements which refer only to the candidate
making the expenditure are exempted from this restriction because they
are less effective and less likely to have a corrupting influence on
candidates.87 For those reasons, the soft money expenditure restrictions
survived First Amendment attack.88
The plaintiffs in McConnell argued that Buckley distinguished between
express advocacy for a candidate and general issue advocacy, and therefore
speakers had “an inviolable First Amendment right to engage in the latter.”89
This argument, the Court explained, misinterpreted Buckley since express
advocacy restrictions were upheld as a matter of “statutory interpretation
rather than constitutional command.”90 If Buckley had conferred an
inviolable right to engage in general issue advocacy, this would have
required a means of drawing a clear line between express advocacy and
general issue advocacy. This is difficult to do and would likely depend on
whether the advertisement contained so-called “magic words” that expressly
advocate for the election or defeat of a political candidate. The Court has
long recognized, however, that the “presence or absence of magic words
cannot meaningfully distinguish electioneering speech from a true issue
ad.”91 This decision therefore rendered Buckley’s magic-words requirement
functionally meaningless.92
Buckley established that corporations and labor unions cannot use
general treasury funds to finance explicit advocacy in federal elections;
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

McConnell, 540 U.S. at 142.
Id. at 138.
Id. at 188.
Id. at 184.
Id.
Id. at 185.
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 190.
Id. at 192.
Id. at 193 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45).
Id. at 193.
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however, BCRA extended this restriction to soft money contributions. The
restrictions on soft money contributions only apply to general treasury funds,
and still allow for the creation of PACs by corporations and labor unions to
finance electioneering communications.94 Requiring soft money funds to be
segregated in PACs helps eliminate the concern of using corporate funds to
advance political causes or candidates at odds with the views of some
shareholders or members.95 While the plaintiffs conceded that the
Government has a compelling interest in regulating express advocacy
advertisements, they argued that the segregated–fund requirement was
overbroad.96 The plaintiffs claimed that, while the justifications of
preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption apply to express
advocacy, they do not apply to “significant quantities of speech encompassed
by the definition of electioneering communications.”97
The Court dismissed this argument because “issue ads broadcast[ed]
during the 30-day and 60-day periods preceding federal primary and general
elections are the functional equivalent of express advocacy.”98 The
justifications therefore apply as long as the advertisements aired in the two
months leading up to the election are intended to influence voters’ decisions,
and have that effect.99 If issue advocacy advertisements were not subject to
the same segregated-fund requirement, then, in the future, corporations and
labor unions would simply circumvent the express advocacy restriction
upheld in Buckley and achieve the same effect by avoiding specific
references to candidates in advertisements.100
In Justice Scalia’s Dissenting Opinion, he argued that the expenditure
of money on political campaigns is equivalent to speech, and therefore
should not be abridged.101 Justice Scalia notes that there are three main
arguments in favor of permitting the restriction of political money, but finds
none of them convincing: (1) money is not speech, (2) pooling money is not
speech, and (3) speech by corporations can be abridged.102 To support his
argument, he references the origins of the concept of freedom of speech from

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

McConnell, 540 U.S. at 203-04.
Id. at 204.
Id.
Id. at 204-05.
Id. at 206.
Id.
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 206.
Id.
Id. at 248 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part).
Id. at 250-56.
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the British Stamp Act of 1765, and the fact that the language of the First
Amendment does not explicitly reference corporations.103
Though Justice Scalia states that corporations were a familiar figure in
American economic life at the time of the United States Bill of Rights, he
failed to acknowledge that the sheer number of corporations in modern
society has increased, and accordingly, their ability to influence politics, to
the point where it is well beyond anything the Framers envisioned.104 At the
end of the eighteenth century, American corporations did not have the money
or technology to effectively drown out all other voices. Additionally,
comparing the expenditure or contribution of money to promote a political
view to pure speech, such as printing a newspaper, implies that a person with
more money is permitted to have more speech. This flies in the face of the
constitutional guarantee that all people, rich or poor, are equal. Similarly,
Justice Scalia’s assertion that pooling money in the form of political parties
should be considered speech goes against his own originalist argument
because the Founding Fathers did not want the country to become divided
by political parties. President George Washington urged as much in his
farewell address, stressing “the danger of parties in the State.”105 While
Justice Scalia’s arguments comprised the Dissenting Opinon in McConnell,
they became the Majority Opinion just seven years later in Citizens United
v. Federal Election Commission.

C. Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010)
While Buckley and McConnell upheld FECA and BCRA prohibitions
on corporations and labor unions using general treasury funds for political
expenditures, the Court reversed these decisions in Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission.106 The Court’s primary reasoning behind
reversing thirty-five years of precedent was that independent expenditures
constitute speech and the government may not discriminate between
speakers when regulating speech.107 This premise requires viewing
corporations as entities which have an equal First Amendment right to free
speech as do natural persons, a view that is contested in corporate law. As
Justice Stevens points out in his Dissenting Opinion, however, corporations
“are not natural persons,” and though they contribute enormous amounts to
society, they are not members of it.108
103.
104.
105.

McConnell, 540 U.S. at 250-56 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part).
Id. at 256.
See George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 19, 1796), in CLAYPOOLE’S AM.
DAILY ADVERTISER.
106. 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010).
107. Id. at 341.
108. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 424 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).

(DO NOT DELETE)

FALL 2019]

10/7/2019 11:44 AM

CORPORATE CONSTITUENTS

179

The Court has long held that campaign finance restrictions are subject
to strict scrutiny because they burden speech, so the restrictions must further
a compelling interest and be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.109 In
past opinions, the Court found that the government has a compelling interest
in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, along with an
interest in preventing the distorting effects created by the expenditure of
large sums of money by corporations on political advertising.110 In this case,
the Court continued to acknowledge that the government has an interest in
anti-distortion, anticorruption, and shareholder protection, but dismissed
each as a justification for limiting independent expenditures by
corporations.111 This is concerning because if those interests are not
compelling enough to limit the vast amount of independent expenditures that
corporations can make, it is difficult to imagine an interest that would be
sufficiently compelling.
The Court found that the interest in anti-distortion is outweighed by the
censorship of “millions of associations of citizens,” preventing their voices
and viewpoints from reaching the public.112 In making this argument, the
Court failed to recognize that BCRA does nothing to censor those citizens
from engaging in political speech themselves, and permits corporations to
engage in political speech through PACs. The Buckley Court found the
interest of preventing quid pro quo corruption compelling, but in this case
the Court found this argument unconvincing, as expenditures give “influence
over or access to elected officials,” but do not necessarily mean those
officials are corrupt.113 The Majority expressed confidence in the belief that
the electorate will not “lose faith in our democracy” due to the appearance
of corporate influence or access to elected officials.114 The Majority stated
that “the people have the ultimate influence over elected officials,” ignoring
the persuasive effect of corporations’ deep pocketbooks.115 Finally, the
Court rejected the Government’s interest in protecting the views of
shareholders with dissenting political views from the corporation simply
because it would give the government the authority to restrict the
corporation’s political speech.116

109. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340 (citing Fed. Elec. Comm’n v. Wis. Right To Life, 551
U.S. 449, 464 (2007)).
110. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 348; McConnell, 540 U.S. 93, 204-05; Austin v. Mich.
Chamber of Com., 494 U.S. 652, 661 (1990).
111. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 348-49.
112. Id. at 354.
113. Id. at 359.
114. Id. at 360.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 361.
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While the Court did consider advances in technology, such as the
Internet, it believed that these advances counsel against restricting corporate
speech, rather than in favor of restricting it.117 This statement runs counter
to media consumption in the real world, where the expenditure of more
money leads to the dissemination of a message to more people, and the
drowning out of other views by monopolizing limited advertising space and
time.118 By ruling that no government interest justifies prohibiting corporate
political expenditures, the Court overturned the precedent from McConnell
and Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce.119
Justice Stevens, joined by three Justices, wrote a scathing and lengthy
Dissenting Opinion, emphasizing that although the First Amendment
prohibits distinguishing between speakers when restricting speech, it is
inaccurate to treat the “identity” of corporations as identical to that of
natural persons.120 Corporations cannot vote or run for office, and may
have interests that conflict with eligible voters as they may be controlled
by nonresidents.121 These facts provide lawmakers with a compelling
interest, “if not also a democratic duty, to . . . guard against the potentially
deleterious effects of corporate spending” in federal campaigns.122
Additionally, corporations have historically been prohibited from
campaign spending since the passage of the Tillman Act in 1907, a
precedent so accepted by Buckley that there was no constitutional
challenge to the corporation restriction.123
In overturning Austin and McConnell, the Court went against stare
decisis, and claimed those decisions are “dead wrong in [their] reasoning or
irreconcilable with the rest of [the Court’s] doctrine.”124 Justice Stevens
pointed out the contradictions inherent in the Majority’s opinion, such as the
fact that political parties are prohibited from spending soft money on express
advocacy advertisements, while corporations are now free to spend as much
general treasury money on these same adsvertisements as they wish.125 This
“dramatically enhances the role of corporations and unions—and the narrow

117. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 364.
118. Corporations are able to use their vast resources to purchase far more advertising than
individual people, and therefore can drown out opposing viewpoints by purchasing more
advertising time in the lead up to elections.
119. Citizens United, 558 U.S at 366.
120. Id. at 394 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 409.
125. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 412.
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interests they represent” in the political system, along with the distorting
effects of the immense amount of money available to those groups.126
The Majority Opinion of Citizens United rests on three premises: (1)
Austin and McConnell have banned corporate speech, (2) the First
Amendment precludes regulatory distinction based on the speaker’s
“identity” as a corporation, and (3) Austin and McConnell were radical
outliers in campaign finance doctrine.127 Each of these premises are wrong.
The statutes do not impose an absolute ban on corporate spending, but rather
prohibit spending from the general treasury funds, while leaving open the
option to establish separate, segregated funds in the form of PACs.128 While
FECA and BCRA single out corporations, the Court previously held that
speech may be regulated on account of the speaker’s identity when
understood in institutional terms, such as “students, prisoners, members of
the Armed Forces, foreigners, and [government] employees,” so long as the
restrictions are justified by legitimate government interests.129 The Majority
in Citizens United would appear to “afford the same protection to
multinational corporations controlled by foreigners as to individual
Americans.”130 The Majority emphasizes the identity-based distinctions of
FECA and BCRA “without ever explaining why corporate identity demands
the same treatment as individual identity” of natural persons.131
As to the third premise, Justice Stevens asserted that in assessing the
First Amendment’s tradition, corporations were never intended to be
permitted the same freedom of speech protections as natural persons.132
Corporations at the time of the Founding were explicitly authorized by
legislative charter, and the Framers considered Free Speech Rights of the
individual when drafting the First Amendment, rather than that of
corporations.133 Further, the views of the Framers are not altogether useful
when applying the First Amendment to campaign finance regulations
because of how radically different today’s political universe is from theirs.134
The Majority Opinion downplays the Government’s interests in
anticorruption, anti-distortion, and protecting the views of dissenting

126. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 412.
127. Id. at 414-15.
128. Id. at 415.
129. Id. at 420 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
130. Id. at 424.
131. Id. at 425.
132. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 425.
133. Id. at 427-28; see Alina Ball, Contextualizing the Corporate Rights Movement in
Transactional Clinics, 7 TENN. J. RACE GENDER & SOC. JUST. 257, 260 (2018) (emphasis added).
134. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 432 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).

(DO NOT DELETE)

182

10/7/2019 11:44 AM

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 47:1

135

shareholder in relation to corporate political expenditures. The Majority’s
view that Congress may only regulate explicit quid pro quo arrangements
ignores the fact that corruption or the appearance of corruption “operates
along a spectrum,” and selling access in exchange for campaign financing
can be equally damaging to the political system and the public’s view of
corruption in Congress.136 The current regime has resulted in members of
Congress who will only meet with lobbyists who give them money, rather
than listening to views from all sides on any given issue.137 The Court’s
narrow reading of the government’s anticorruption interest—that it is limited
to clear quid pro quo corruption—makes this interest essentially useless in
regulating, as “proving that a specific vote was exchanged for a specific
expenditure has always been next to impossible.”138 This interpretation
ignores the Government’s interest in protecting the public’s faith in its
representatives and its government in general, for “a democracy cannot
function effectively when its constituent members believe laws are being
bought and sold.”139 The Court instead chooses not to show deference to
Congress, who have first-hand experience with the corrupting effects of
corporate expenditures, while providing “no clear rationale” for doing so.140
The Government’s interest in preventing the distorting effects of
corporate campaign expenditures is compelling as well, because very few
natural persons have access to the amount of money maintained by a
corporation. A corporation’s primary goal is to be as profitable as possible,
which causes it to “amass and deploy financial resources on a scale few
natural persons can match.”141 Additionally, corporations must engage in
the electoral process “to enhance the profitability of the company, no matter
how persuasive the arguments for a broader or conflicting set of priorities,”
which leads them to advocate policies beneficial to themselves, but not
always those beneficial to the country.142 Corporations also “have no
consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires,” and may be
controlled by foreigners.143 Finally, due to their deep pocketbooks,
corporations may “grab up the prime broadcast slots on the eve of an

135. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 447 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
136. Id. at 448.
137. Megan Leonhardt, A Trump Official Said He Only Listened to Lobbyists Who Gave Him
Money. Here’s Who Gave Him the Most, TIME MAG., (Apr. 25, 2018), http://time.com/money/
5254233/mulvaney-listens-to-bank-lobbyist/.
138. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 455 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
139. Id. at 453.
140. Id. at 460.
141. Id. at 470.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 465-66.
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election,” flooding the market with advocacy not correlated to the ideas of
natural persons, and thereby marginalize the views of real people.144 Due to
these qualities of corporations, their electioneering creates a distorting effect
on policies that Congress has a compelling interest in limiting.
Finally, the shareholders of a corporation foot the bill for the use of
general treasury funds on political expenditures, which inevitably means that
some shareholders’ money is “used to undermine their political
convictions.”145 This problem is eliminated with the statutory exception
provided for PACs, ensuring that “those who pay for an electioneering
communication actually support its contents.”146 While this interest on its
own is not sufficient to justify restrictions on corporate expenditures, it
reinforces the Government’s anti–distortion interest by adding another
reason to doubt that corporate political expenditures reflect actual public
support for the political ideas espoused.147
These points emphasize why corporate campaign expenditures are more
likely to impair government interests, and why restrictions on those
expenditures are less likely to infringe on First Amendment freedoms: It is
difficult to explain “who” is speaking through the corporation.148 Simply
put, corporations “are not themselves members of ‘We the People’ by whom
and for whom our Constitution was established.’”149 Once Citizens United
lifted restrictions on corporate campaign expenditures, aggregate limits
remained the only restraint on money flowing into elections, until those too
were struck down a year later.

D. McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission (2014)
The final constitutional challenge to FECA attacked aggregate limits to
campaign contributions in McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission.150
Aggregate limits restrict the amount of money a donor may contribute in
total, while base limits restrict the amount of money a donor may contribute
to a particular candidate.151 Following the same reasoning as in Citizens
United, the Court struck down aggregate limits to campaign contributions
because Congress may not regulate “simply to reduce the amount of money
in politics, or to restrict the political participation of some in order to enhance
144. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 470 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
145. Id. at 475.
146. Id.
147. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 478 (citing Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Com., 494 U.S. 652,
660 (1990)).
148. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 466 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
149. Id.
150. 572 U.S. at 192.
151. Id.
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the relative influence of others.”
The Court found that aggregate limits
“do little, if anything” to prevent the circumvention of base limits to
campaign contributions, and struck down aggregate limits as violative of the
First Amendment.153
In striking down aggregate limits, the Court overturned Buckley, which
found that the Government’s compelling interest in preventing corruption or
the appearance of corruption was sufficient to justify the restrictions on
aggregate contributions in a political cycle.154 The Court held that Buckley
“does not control here” with regard to the constitutionality of aggregate
limits because Buckley “spent a total of three sentences analyzing that limit,”
and “safeguards against circumvention have been considerably
strengthened” since that decision.155 The Court also relied on the fact that
the First Amendment “safeguards an individual’s right to participate in the
public debate through political expression,” though Buckley distinguished
campaign contributions from campaign expenditures under the notion that
contributions were more of an exercise of the right to associate, while
expenditures exercised the right to express political beliefs.156
McCutcheon finds that aggregate limits “prohibit an individual from
fully contributing to the primary and general election campaigns of ten or
more candidates,” and thereby impermissibly infringes on First Amendment
protections.157 While the Buckley Court characterized the aggregate limit as
“quite a modest restraint upon protected political activity,” the McCutcheon
Court disagreed, stating that a limit on the number of candidates to whom a
donor may contribute money “is not a ‘modest restraint’ at all.”158 The Court
characterizes the Government’s interest in preventing corruption or its
appearance as legitimate, seemingly downgraded from its characterization as
compelling in Buckley.159 But as in Citizens United, the Court takes the
narrow view that the government may only target actual quid pro quo
arrangements of contributions for votes.160
The Court finds that “spending money in connection with elections, but
not in connection with an effort to control the exercise of an office holder’s
official duties” does not give rise to the quid pro quo corruption that

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 191.
Id. at 193.
Id. at 200.
Id.
Id.at 203.
Id. at 204.
McCutcheon, 572 U.S at 204 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 38).
McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 207.
Id.
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Congress may regulate.
This scope of regulatory power is functionally
impractical in the real world because any quid pro quo agreement is nearly
impossible to prove, and the sale of access for campaign donations can be
just as corrupting and cause just as much disillusionment in voters as actual
votes for contribution agreements. The Court focuses on the fact that
FECA’s aggregate limit would permit donating the base limit of $5,200 to
nine candidates, but not ten.162 While this argument makes the limits seem
arbitrary, it ignores the fact that having no limit at all makes it impossible to
advance, as the Majority concedes, the Government’s “legitimate interest”
in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption.163 Simply put, the
line must be drawn somewhere, and the Majority attacks the hard limit based
on the fact that it is a hard limit, without showing alternatives that would
effectively replace those aggregate limits.164
In his Dissent, Justice Breyer explains that while the expansive record
compiled in McConnell did not turn up a single instance of quid pro quo
corruption, it did reveal that enormous soft money contributions provided
disproportionate access to lawmakers and the ability to influence
legislation.165 This form of corruption is exactly the type that the Majority’s
narrow definition of corruption or its appearance excludes, and is the type
that Congress sought to prevent through FECA and BCRA. Aggregate limits
serve to prevent corruption because there is “an indisputable link between
generous political donations and opportunity after opportunity to make one’s
case directly to a Member of Congress.”166 The ruling in McCutcheon
substitutes Judges’ understandings of how the political process works for the
understanding of Congress, overturns key precedent, and creates expansive
loopholes in the law that “undermines, perhaps devastates, what remains of
campaign finance reform.”167

III. Money as Speech in Current Congressional Elections
At this point, base contribution limits are the only campaign finance
restrictions that have survived constitutional attack, which has led to an
exponential increase in the amount of money spent on each national election.
The disillusionment of voters that the Supreme Court dismissed as
improbable has led to a rise in the popularity of candidates who refuse to

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 208.
Id. at 210.
Id. at 207.
McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 257-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 241 (Majority Opinion).
Id.
McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 260-61 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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take corporate PAC money, because voters believe those candidates will
represent them rather than the corporations who contributed to their
campaigns.168 One recent example is Congresswoman Alexandria OcasioCortez, who defeated ten-term Congressman Joe Crowley in the 2018
midterm primary election despite being outraised by a 10-to-1 margin.169
Ocasio-Cortez won without taking any “corporate lobbyist money,” with
over 89,000 donations that averaged only $20.86 per donation.170 This
message that “it’s not OK to put donors before your community” has
resonated with voters due to the increasing feeling that members of Congress
represent their donors rather than their constituents.171
This is not a baseless sentiment, as financial records have shown that
86% of contributions for some congressmen come from businesses.172
When such a large percentage of the funds necessary to win reelection
comes from corporations, it affects the votes of representatives in
Congress. Those representatives are told by donors to pass bills beneficial
to those donors “or don’t ever call me again.”173 As a result, those
representatives vote in favor of bills even if they would negatively affect a
large number their constituents, because of the need to please their donor
class—“i.e., corporate and wealthy America”—and to be able to raise the
large sums of money required to win re–election.174 Representatives vote
how their donors want them to vote, rather than how their constitutents
want them to vote, because they need the “speech” in the form of
independent expenditures protected by the First Amendment to win
reelection. While not the explicit quid pro quo corruption agreements that
the Supreme Court defined as within the government’s power to regulate,
this form of corruption or at least the appearance of corruption is the reason
that Congress passed FECA and BCRA.175

168. Lee Drutman, The Case for Cautious Optimism on Campaign Finance Reform, VOX
(Aug. 21, 2018, 1:50 PM), https://www.vox.com/polyarchy/2018/8/21/17764362/campaign-finan
ce-reform-optimism.
169. Gregory Krieg, A 28-Year-Old Democrat Socialist Just Ousted a Powerful, 10-Term
Congressman in New York, CNN (June 27, 2018, 2:34 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/26/pol
itics/alexandria-ocasio-cortez-joe-crowley-new-york-14-primary/index.html.
170. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (@Ocasio2018), TWITTER (Oct. 18, 2018, 1:41 PM), https://tw
itter.com/ocasio2018/status/1053023260068200448.
171. Krieg, supra note 169.
172. Leonhardt, supra note 137.
173. Dylan Scott, House Republican: My Donors Told Me to Pass the Tax Bill “or Don’t Ever
Call Me Again”, VOX (Nov. 7, 2017, 11:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017
/11/7/16618038/house-republicans-tax-bill-donors-chris-collins.
174. Id.
175. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27.

(DO NOT DELETE)

FALL 2019]

10/7/2019 11:44 AM

CORPORATE CONSTITUENTS

187

The skyrocketing amount of money required to win a congressional
election has allowed donors to exercise more undue influence on members
of Congress. Due to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Citizens United and
McCutcheon, nearly unlimited spending in elections means that members of
Congress must spend much of their time “dialing for dollars.”176 The average
cost of winning a Senate seat in 2016 was $10.4 million, while a House seat
cost the winner $1.4 million.177 This means that Senators must raise $4,748
per day from the day they are sworn in, while members of the House must
raise $1,917 per day in order to win reelection. These numbers are only
higher in competitive states and districts, and as a result, newly elected
members of Congress must spend at last thirty hours per week calling donors
to raise money, which takes time away from legislating for the good of their
constituents, which they were elected to do.178 Citizens United is a direct
cause of this, as the hours spent fundraising per day jumped from an hour
and a half to three or four hours following the decision.179
Due to the enormous price tag associated with congressional
campaigns, it is no wonder that so many candidates accept the large
paychecks offered by corporations, rather than spending more time on the
phone soliciting donations. While many democratic candidates (at least 170
candidates in the 2018 midterm election) have refused to take corporate PAC
money, they are fighting an uphill battle against those who do take corporate
PAC money in exchange for access to those candidates once they are elected
for lobbying purposes.180 Until the exorbitant amount of money spent on
campaigns is controlled, voters will continue to believe the system is corrupt,
and that their “vote does not matter because of the influence that wealthy
individuals and corporations have on the electoral process.”181 A November
2015 poll showed that 93% of Democrats and 88% of Republicans said the
government “tended ‘very’ or ‘somewhat well’ to the interests of the
wealthy,” while 90% of Democrats and 86% of Republicans said the
government did the same for big corporations.182
176. Norah O’Donnell, Are Members of Congress Becoming Telemarketers?, CBS NEWS
(Apr. 24, 2016), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/60-minutes-are-members-of-congress-becoming
-telemarketers/.
177. Soo Rin Kim, The Price of Winning Just Got Higher, Especially in the Senate, OPEN
SECRETS (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2016/11/the-price-of-winning-justgot-higher-especially-in-the-senate/.
178. O’Donnell, supra note 176.
179. Id.
180. Drutman, supra note 168.
181. Id.
182. Harold Meyerson, Americans See a Government of, by and for the Rich, WASH. POST
(Nov. 18, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/americans-see-a-government-of-byand-for-the-rich/2015/11/18/8c8e001a-8e19-11e5-acff-673ae92ddd2b_story.html.
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IV. Fixing the Problem:
How to Return Power to Real, Living Constituents
A. United States Supreme Court: Constitutional Limits and
Disclosure Requirements
Perhaps the most important arena where a change in sentiment
towards campaign finance should occur is in the jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court of the United States. Freedom of speech, at least in the area
of political contributions and expenditures, must be reclaimed for natural
persons alone, and not for corporate entities. Without changing the
permissibility of certain campaign financing regulations, any legitimate
attempts at reform will be struck down on constitutional grounds. The
combination of Citizens United and McCutcheon appears to leave few
avenues of acceptable campaign finance reform for the current Supreme
Court. The most likely avenue for comprehensive campaign finance
reform would be a return in thinking by the Court to that of Buckley, Austin
v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, and McConnell.183
In Austin, the Court followed the reasoning of Buckley and held that
it was constitutional to ban corporations from making independent
campaign expenditures.184 The Austin Court upheld the restriction on
corporate campaign expenditures based on the same government interests
of anticorruption, anti-distortion, and shareholder protection, which the
court later found were not sufficiently compelling or narrowly tailored in
Citizens United.185
The Supreme Court has ruled favorably on some issues relating to
campaign finance regulations, such as ordering disclosure for donations to
“dark money” political nonprofit groups, which previously were not
required to disclose the identity of donors.186 These dark money nonprofits
are organized as Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(4) social welfare
or 501(c)(6) business associations, and previously did not have to disclose
their donors as long as less than 50% of their donations went to political
contributions or expenditures.187 However, the Court has consistently
upheld disclosure laws relating to campaign financing, only striking down

183. Buckley, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Austin, 494 U.S. 652 (1990); McConnell, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
184. Austin, 494 U.S. at 668.
185. Id. at 660.
186. Peter Overby, Supreme Court Orders Disclosure For Dark Money, As New Report
Unveils Some Donors, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Sept. 18, 2018, 5:01 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/09/
18/648722358/supreme-court-orders-disclosure-for-dark-money-as-new-report-unveils-somedonors.
187. Id.; I.R.C. § 501(c)(4); I.R.C. § 501(c)(6).
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restrictions on contributions and expenditures due to their First
Amendment implications.188
There seems to be little hope for a return to the thinking of Buckley,
Austin, and McConnell in the near future as the two newest Supreme Court
Justices, Justice Gorsuch and Justice Kavanaugh, both support the rationale
of Citizens United and McCutcheon.189 Justice Gorsuch wrote a Concurring
Opinion in Riddle v. Hickenlooper, arguing that contributing to political
campaigns implicates the basic constitutional freedoms to speak and
associate, and should not be infringed upon.190 In a memo written in 2002,
Justice Kavanaugh argued that the way to fix the campaign finance system
is “to eliminate contribution limits,” rather than regulating the overall
amount of money spent independently.191 While he believes contribution
limits should be struck down, Justice Kavanaugh upheld a prohibition on
foreign participation in United States elections because “foreign citizens do
not have a constitutional right to participate in” United States elections.192
Therefore, it appears unlikely that Citizens United will be overturned by the
current Supreme Court, at least until one of the remaining members of the
Citizens United Majority is replaced, and thus, advocates for campaign
finance reform must look elsewhere in search of means for reform.

B. Congressional Legislation
Another avenue for campaign finance reform is through congressional
legislation that attempts to comply with the rulings of the Supreme Court.
Democratic Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi stated
before the 2018 midterm elections that a Democratic House would push for
changes to campaign finance laws.193 To follow through on this statement,
House Democrats unveiled the first bill they planned to pass when seated on
January 3, 2019, which includes provisions requiring “all political
organizations to disclose donors and an overhaul of the Federal Election

188. See Buckley, 424 U.S. 1; McConnell, 540 U.S. 93.
189. Justin Fox, How Money Became Speech, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 6, 2018, 9:48 AM), https://
www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-09-06/brett-kavanaugh-and-the-history-of-campaignspending-law; Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Neil Gorsuch Understands Campaign Finance—And That’s
The Problem, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/
neil-gorsuch-understands-campaign-finance-%E2%80%93-and-that%E2%80%99s-problem.
190. 742 F.3d 922, 930 (10th Cir. 2014) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); Torres-Spelliscy, supra
note 189.
191. Fox, supra note 189.
192. Bluman v. Fed. Elec. Comm’n, 800 F.Supp.2d 281, 288 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
193. Nancy Pelosi: I’m Confident Democrats Will Retake the House, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct.
16, 2018), https://apnews.com/7417eaae2163475ea289a29373d2de18.
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Commission.
As promised, the House of Representatives introduced the
“For the People Act” on January 3, 2019, and passed the bill on March 8,
2019.195 While this bill likely will not even receive a vote in the Sennate, it
shows that Democrats are focused on addressing the issue, and may include
parts of the bill “as policy riders in government spending bills or other large
pieces of legislation.”196
Because the Supreme Court has made clear that restrictions on
contributions and expenditures are unconstitutional under the First
Amendment, Democrats are promising to pass a “small-donor campaign
finance matching system” to help bolster the power of less wealthy
individuals.197 This system would match small-dollar contributions six-toone with public money in order to incentivize members of Congress to seek
funds from their constituents rather than corporations.198 Some caution is
warranted in believing these bills will fix the campaign finance system, as
campaign finance reform is “easy to promise and hard to deliver.”199
Opponents of a public financing system argue they should not be forced
to pay for the campaigns of politicians they do not support.200 However, this
argument rings hollow—the Court found this argument unconvincing when
it was made in favor of the Government’s interest in protecting dissenting
shareholders in Citizens United.201 The idea behind the bill is to “fight and
end the dominance of big money in politics,” and to promote the issue on the
national stage, even if it will be rejected by Senate Majority Leader Mitch
McConnell, who has long been outspoken against efforts of campaign
finance reform.202 Any congressional legislation would have to survive
constitutional challenges however, which will likely entail an uphill battle
with the current Supreme Court.
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/30/house-democrats-campaign-finance-ethics-laws-1034657.
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C. Constitutional Amendment
The most difficult method of enacting campaign finance reform, but
also the only way that does not require a change in opinion by the Supreme
Court, is to pass a constitutional amendment reversing Citizens United and
McCutcheon. A constitutional amendment must receive votes by “two thirds
of both houses,” and must be “ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of
the several states.”203 Alternatively, a constitutional convention may be
called for by two-thirds of the state legislatures, and any amendment that is
ratified by three-fourths of the state legislatures is passed.204 However, no
constitutional amendment has been passed since 1992, when the 27th
Amendment, requiring any pay changes for Congress to take effect after the
next election, was ratified.205
This sounds like an insurmountable challenge in today’s hyperpolarized political world, but recent studies have shown that three-fourths
of survey respondents, including 66% of Republicans and 85% of
Democrats, support a constitutional amendment reversing Citizens
United.206 The same study shows that 88% of Americans “want to reduce
the influence large campaign donors wield over lawmakers at a time when
a single congressional election may cost tens of millions of dollars.”207
Additionally, 60% of survey respondents viewed the reduction of influence
of big campaign donors as “very important.”208 Less than half of those
surveyed considered an anti-Citizens United amendment to be an attack on
Free Speech Rights and more than four out of five agreed with the
statement that “the rich should not have more influence just because they
have more money.”209
This public support did not appear following the decision of Citizens
United in 2010—since at least 2001, more than three-fourths of Americans
continue to believe there should be tighter limits on political campaign

203. U.S. CONST. art. V.
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contributions. This vast public support for the “most drastic step that can
be taken” reflects public frustration that elected representatives are
influenced by major donors rather than by the needs of their constituents.211
There have been several amendments proposed, but the “We The
People Amendment” is the one that has garnered the most support, with
sixty-five cosponsors in the House of Representatives.212 This amendment
would reserve the rights protected by the Constitution for “natural persons
only,” and enable federal, state, and local governments to regulate political
contributions and expenditures in order to ensure all citizens have access to
the political process while preventing any person from gaining substantially
more influence than others due to their wealth.213 Critics of these types of
proposed amendments argue they are not sufficiently focused on campaign
finance because they would strip corporations off all constitutional
protections, rather than just First Amendment speech protections.214 These
criticisms are justified as any constitutional amendment must be careful not
to go too far and risk protecting outright regulation of any political speech.215
The overwhelming majority of the public supports campaign finance reform,
however, which makes a constitutional amendment much more likely than it
would appear at first glance.

Conclusion
Congress recognized the corrupting effects of money in politics early
on and passed regulations in an attempt to stem the influence of big donors
on politicians with the Tillman Act of 1907, FECA, and BCRA. These
regulations were effective, but the Supreme Court’s decisions in Citizens
United and McCutcheon, overturning Buckley, Austin, and McConnell, have
led to a flood of money into political campaigns, and disillusionment among
voters about their actual influence on government and their political
representatives. Large corporate donations buy access to legislators while
210. Bradley Jones, Most Americans Want to Limit Campaign Spending, Say Big Donors Have
Greater Political Influence, PEW RES. CENTER (May 8, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2018/05/08/most-americans-want-to-limit-campaign-spending-say-big-donors-have-greaterpolitical-influence/; David W. Moore, Widespread Public Support for Campaign Finance Reform,
GALLUP (Mar. 20, 2001), https://news.gallup.com/poll/1885/widespread-public-support-campaig
n-finance-reform.aspx.
211. Balcerzak, supra note 206.
212. H.R.J. Res. 48, 115th Cong. §1 (2017).
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214. Mark Schmitt, The Wrong Way to Fix Citizens United, NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 19, 2012),
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the Supreme Court has ruled that Congress may only target explicit quid pro
quo arrangements of contributions or expenditures in exchange for votes.
The current campaign finance system results in members of Congress
spending multiple hours a day fundraising rather than legislating, and in
voters clamoring politicians to “drain the swamp” and fight corruption.216
Barring a change in the ideological makeup of the Supreme Court, a
ruling overturning Citizens United and returning to the rationale of Buckley
and McConnell, permitting regulating to prevent corruption or the
appearance of corruption, seems unlikely. Democratic members of the
House of Representatives have promised to pass campaign finance reform
by bolstering the influence of smaller contributions, but these bills are
unlikely to become law unless Democrats take control of the Senate and
Presidency at the same time in the future. These potential laws would also
be subject to constitutional challenge, and whether they would survive that
challenge remains to be seen.
A constitutional amendment to overturn Citizens United and give
political influence back to natural persons would go a long way to solve
problems with campaign financing and voter disillusionment. Additionally,
an amendment would return voting power to the people because candidates
could no longer win elections simply by relying on large expenditures from
corporations. The high bar required to pass such an amendment would be
difficult to reach in today’s hyper-polarized climate however, despite
support by more than three-fourths of Americans.
Ultimately,
accomplishing effective campaign finance reform will require immense
effort and political capital on the part of elected representatives, but is
absolutely worth the fight to protect the foundational idea of our democracy:
that the government is established by the People and for the People.

216.
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